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When will the “ordinary and natural” meaning of words prevail? 
 
 
While lawyers remain human, errors in the drafting of documents will continue to 
occur.  Given that “small” errors in drafting may have considerable financial and other 
impacts, the approach that a court may adopt to the construction of an impugned 
document is likely to be critical.  This article will address recent decisions of interest 
and examine when the “ordinary and natural” meaning of words will prevail or when 
the Court may, as a matter of construction, supply words, omit words or correct 
words in an instrument.  The discussion will focus on what has become known as the 
“absurdity rule”. 
 
A starting point is the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Westpac 
Banking Corporation v Tanzone1.  A poorly drafted rent review clause was the 
cause of the litigation. 
 
Facts 
 
After the completion of a sale, build and leaseback arrangement Westpac became a 
tenant of premises in Lithgow under a 20 year lease.  Unbeknown to Westpac and 
the original landlord the rent review clause in the lease contained an error.  The error 
came to light when Tanzone Pty Ltd became the owner of the land and tried to apply 
the rent review clause as drafted.  The result of a literal reading of the provision was 
that the rent payable would skyrocket, rather than simply increasing in accordance 
with CPI increases.  From an initial rent of under $70,000.00 in 1985, Tanzone Pty 
Ltd claimed that the rental payable in 1999 was in excess of $740,000.00 per annum. 
 
At first instance, Windeyer J was not prepared to accede to any of the arguments 
raised by Westpac in an attempt to combat what seemed to be an extraordinary 
windfall to the new landlord.  In particular, Windeyer J rejected Westpac’s 
submission, as a matter of construction, that a literal reading of the rent review 
provision should not prevail.  Whilst the result of a literal reading was unreasonable, 
mere unreasonableness was not of itself sufficient to deny Tanzone Pty Ltd, as 
purchaser, the benefits of indefeasibility.  Windeyer J acknowledged that as against 
the original landlord Westpac could seek rectification of the rent review clause 
however Tanzone Pty Ltd was entitled to the benefits of indefeasibility and could hold 
free of Westpac’s right of rectification. 
 
Decision of the Court of Appeal 
 
The New South Wales Court of Appeal (Priestly, Fitzgerald JJA and Foster AJA) 
allowed Westpac’s appeal.  The only issue on appeal was the issue of construction.  
The Court of Appeal opined that a literal interpretation of the clause would produce a 
result that was not merely unreasonable but clearly “absurd”.  The omission of certain 
words from the rent review clause was an obvious mistake producing an absurdity.  
For this reason the offending paragraph had to be read as if certain words were 
added to it to correct the drafting error.  Construing the paragraph in this manner 
“avoids the absurdity of the Rent Review Clause and properly reflects the intention of 
the parties to be gathered objectively from the whole context of the lease”2. 
                                                 
 
Due to the method of construction adopted by the Court, it did not matter that 
Tanzone Pty Ltd was now the owner of the land in question. 
 
A similar factual situation faced the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South 
Australia in Dockside Holdings Pty Ltd v Rakio Pty Ltd 3. Once again a poorly 
drafted rent review clause was the cause of the litigation. 
 
Facts 
 
The plaintiff (and ultimately appellant) was the lessee of a pawnbroking and second-
hand shop.  The long term lease reserved an initial rent of $92,400.00 per annum 
with various rent review mechanisms including a market review every five (5) years.  
A literal reading of the market review clause would require a valuer, after determining 
the variation between market rent at the commencement date of the lease and the 
current market rent, to add this amount to the rental payable before the review.  The 
problem with this literal reading of the clause being that the rental payable before the 
review had already been varied in accordance with relevant CPI and percentage 
increases.  Put simply, a literal interpretation lead to an exercise in double counting. 
 
Decision of the South Australian Full Court 
 
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Olsson, Duggan and 
Williams JJ) had to determine whether the “ordinary and natural” meaning of the 
words used should prevail.  Having identified a capricious element in the rent fixing 
formula and the extraordinary results that the formula produced, the court observed 
that the procedure and its outcome were “lacking in commercial common sense”4.  It 
seemed to the Court that some sort of mistake must have occurred. 
 
Following the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Tanzone5 the Court recognised, albeit somewhat hesitantly, the extent 
to which (without rectification) the Court could redraft the clause for construction 
purposes (the “absurdity rule”).  In this instance the absurdity rule had to be applied. 
 
“The literal approach for which the landlord contends produces a ridiculous 
commercial result based upon a review process which flouts commonsense.  The 
nature of the mistake and what was intended is sufficiently clear as to justify the 
Court in reading the document “as if” the appropriate language has been used to 
reflect the intention of the parties”6. 
 
On this basis the appellant obtained declaratory relief.  The declaration being that 
upon a true construction of the lease the market rental payable in the year in 
question was to be determined by a valuer rather than the absurd result that flowed 
from a literal reading. 
 
It is important to note that the application of the “absurdity rule” has not been 
confined to rent review clauses.  In a recent decision, Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Jimenez 
and Ors7, Justice Prior of the Supreme Court of South Australia applied the absurdity 
rule in construing a clause in Discount Facility Deeds.  Applying the rule, references 
in the Deeds to “the Assignor” were, as a matter of construction, read as reference to 
“the Company”.  Once again the basis for the decision was that a literal interpretation 
would produce an absurd result, clearly indicating that a mistake had been made. 
 
Interestingly the judgment refers to a “verbal slip”8 having occurred.  Whilst this is 
undoubtedly true, the absurdity rule, as demonstrated, has a far wider ambit of 
operation than mere verbal slips of the type referred to in Fitzgerald v Masters 9 
(where the High Court construed the word “inconsistent” as “consistent”) and Watson 
v Phipps10 (where the Privy Council was able to construe “offer to purchase” as 
“option to purchase”). 
 
Propositions 
 
On the basis of these decisions, a number of propositions emerge. 
 
As a matter of construction and without the need for rectification, words may 
generally be supplied, omitted or corrected in an instrument where it is clearly 
necessary to avoid absurdity and the construction contended for is consistent with 
commercial commonsense (the “absurdity rule”). 
 
The absurdity rule is not confined to the construction of rent review clauses and may 
seemingly arise in any commercial context.  Further the rule, if applicable, is far 
broader in its application than mere “verbal slips”. 
 
Mere unreasonableness of itself is not enough to justify the absurdity rule being 
applied.  The words in an instrument will be given their “ordinary and natural” 
meaning even though unreasonable results may follow.  A literal reading should only 
be displaced when the consequences of a literal reading are so absurd as to point to 
a drafting error.  In these circumstances “the law does not require judges to attribute 
to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had11” 
 
The application of the absurdity rule will involve “questions of degree” 12. 
 
If as a matter of construction the absurdity rule is not applicable the applicant may 
still be entitled to seek rectification as against the original contractual party.  The 
position may be otherwise where the original contractual party has on-sold.  In these 
circumstances the new owner may well be entitled to the benefits of indefeasibility 
and entitled to hold free of the applicant’s right of rectification. 
 
Difficulties 
 
Having stated these propositions, the application of the absurdity rule is problematic. 
 
First, although relief may undoubtedly be available to the “victim” of poor drafting, the 
reverse position is a little less clear.  Whilst in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Jimenez and 
Ors13 relief was successfully obtained by a party whose own representatives were 
responsible for the poor drafting, arguably the result may be categorised as an 
example of a “verbal slip” rather than a strict application of the absurdity rule.  Only 
time will tell if a party may obtain relief relying on the absurdity rule where its own 
drafting produces the absurd result. 
 
Secondly, there may be a fine distinction between a construction result that is 
“merely unreasonable” and one that is “absurd”.  A clear example is provided by the 
different approaches of the trial judge and the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
Westpac Banking Corporation v Tanzone Pty Ltd14.  This distinction is implicit in the 
recognition by the High Court of “questions of degree”. 
 
Thirdly, the application of the absurdity rule is dependent upon the ability of the court 
to objectively gather the intention of the parties from the whole context of the 
impugned instrument. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the ability of a Court to rewrite the terms of a concluded instrument 
under the absurdity rule clearly accords with, and is based on, common sense 
considerations.  Those considerations will dictate when words used in an instrument 
will not be given their “ordinary and natural” meaning.  This article has sought to 
highlight a number of limitations and potential difficulties associated with the rule that, 
in turn, only highlight the continued need for careful drafting.  Unfortunately it is 
inevitable that there will be further decisions to provide guidance on the exact 
parameters of the rule.  These decisions will be monitored with interest. 
 
 
 
Bill Dixon 
Lecturer Law School 
Queensland University of Technology 
Member Centre for Commercial and Property Law 
                                                 
1 [2000] NSWCA 25 
2 [2000] NSWCA 25 at 32 
3 [2001] SASC 78 
4 [2001] SASC 78 at 83 
5 [2000] NSWCA 25 
6 [2001] SASC 78 at 90 
7 [2001] SASC 165 
8 [2001] SASC 165 at 166 
9 (1956) 95 CLR 420 at 426-427 
10 (1986) 60 ALJR 1 at 3 
11 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 913 
 
12 In refusing special leave to appeal from the decision in Westpac Banking Corporation v Tanzone Pty 
Ltd, the High Court observed that the application of the principle of absurdity involves questions of 
degree. 
13 [2001] SASC 165 
14 [2000] NSWCA 25 
